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Esprit and morality: The German, who knows the secret of how to make 
spirit, knowledge and heart boring, and has accustomed himself to feeling 
that boredom is moral, fears of French esprit that it may put out the eyes 
of morality- and yet his fear has in it the fascinated dread of the little bird 
before the rattlesnake. Of the celebrated Germans, none perhaps pos- 
sessed more esprit than Hegel—but he also possessed so great a German 




The citation at the head of this page is from Nietzsche’s Daybreak: 
Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. It points to  a  tension  between  
the registers of French thought, for which the term esprit is a marker,   
and a form of conceptuality which presumes that concepts have mean- 
ings determined independently of the natural languages in which they 
are expressed. It is a theme returned to recurrently by Theodor Adorno, 
a writer whose responses to Friedrich Nietzsche are perhaps under 
researched, in the composition of his extended discussions of meaning 
and conceptuality: Negative Dialectics. A reading of Nietzsche, and an 
appreciation of Nietzsche’s attempts to rescue a register of writing in Ger- 
man, from an over mastering conceptuality, prove a resource for Adorno, 
in his repositioning of dialectics, without a third term, with no resolu- 
tion of hypothesized antitheses, either conceptually, for Hegel, or in his- 
tory, with Marx. The same move may be found, but expressed of course  
in French, in the writings of Georges Bataille and of Maurice Blanchot, 
who borrows Bataille’s phrase concerning a negation without application 
(négation sans emploi). Writing in French, Nancy and Derrida are there- 
fore inclined to cite the formulations provided by Bataille and Blanchot, 
rather than those of Nietzsche and Adorno. There is then a threefold 
genealogy for a critique of Hegel’s conception of determinate negation, 
and of an operation called Aufhebung, its determinate resolution, to be 
traced through the writings of Adorno, of Bataille, and of Blanchot, back 
into the interrogative style of Nietzsche’s interrogations. 
 
 
A key remark here is the following from one of the texts jointly 
authored by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and trans- 
lated into English, in a collection edited by Simon Sparks: 
 
It became clear in our discussions that “retreat of the political” could, 
at first reckoning, take on at least three different meanings: 
1: The Aufhebung of the political, if it is admitted that the Hege- 
lian State aufhebt the political itself (an admission which remains 
to be clarified, and which remains to be submitted to the following 
counter proof: is not the Aufhebung fundamentally political?).2 
 
The remaining two indicated meanings concern, first, a subordination of 
politics to a prior determination of social relations, in terms of a dynamic 
of forces and relations of production, in Marxist thinking; and, second, 
Heidegger on an Entzug, a withdrawal of being, and an arrival of ambi- 
guity and fragmentation, in place of any unity and determinacy of mean- 
ing. The hypothesis is that the work of the concept, as Aufhebung, moves 
thought from a level of human individuality, and interaction in a given 
world, to an order of logical necessity, constituting a world order, with a 
subordination of individual destiny to some universal or cosmopolitical 
interest. For this order, the fate of each individual is the graveyard, the 
Schaedelstaette, invoked in the concluding pages of Hegel’s Phenomenol- 
ogy of Spirit. In this spirit, then the resistance of Adorno, Bataille, and 
Blanchot to the work of the concept is deemed futile: an expression, even, 
of an all too bourgeois resentment. 
Tracing out this genealogy is not the task for this chapter. Here what   
is under discussion is the manner in which the writings of Nancy and       
of Derrida arrive in a space which opens up as an inheritance within    
this lineage. For both Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida, a reading of 
Nietzsche accompanies their engagements with the Grand Masters of the 
German tradition: Heidegger, Husserl, Hegel, and Kant, and indeed with 
what remains of the Greek inauguration of philosophy, as both practice 
and theory. Nancy participated in editing and translating for an edition  
of Nietzsche’s writings in French; Derrida’s text Spurs, in French, dates 
from 1978. In section 197 of Daybreak, Nietzsche follows up this open- 
ing citation of this essay with the following remark: 
 
German hostility to the Enlightenment: Let us consider the intellec- 
tual contribution to general culture made by the Germans in the first 
half of this century, and let us take first the German philosophers: 
they retreated to the first and oldest stage of speculation, for, like the 
thinkers of dreamy ages, they were content with concepts, instead of 




The century in question is of course the nineteenth century, but this diag- 
nosis of a retreat to “the first and oldest stage of speculation” may fit 
certain features of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s preoccupations, their 
declarations of a revival of ontology, and of yet another return to “the 
things themselves.” 
These declarations are analyzed by Adorno  in  Negative  Dialectics,  
and no treatment of the arrival and re-arrival of ontology in philosophi- 
cal discussion is complete without a necessary detour through  Ador- 
no’s critique of the delusions of an ontology which fails adequately to 
address its lineage, and its material and historical conditions of pos- 
sibility. Where unsympathetic readers may find Nancy and Derrida to    
be departing from a domain of philosophical enquiry, classically under- 
stood, with its ready-made distinctions between metaphysics and ethics, 
aesthetics and epistemology, their attempts are rather to be understood 
as reinventions of a  philosophical  terminology,  to  provide  a  register  
of discussion more hospitable to what is unprecedented, and scarcely 
articulable, in contemporary conditions. It is in this critical  spirit  that 
the readings of Hegel, offered by Nancy and by Derrida, are here to be 
explored, together and separately. 
 
2. Politics and the Political 
The discussion is to be located within  a  space  opening  out following 
the experiment, in France, in the early 1980s, twinning the notion of a 
politics, as practical  activity,  in  a  given  public  space,  la politique,  with 
a concept of the political, le politique, as the space of meanings, and 
identity conditions within which such activity takes place, and as which 
public space itself arrives. The role of Hannah Arendt in opening out this 
distinction is freely affirmed by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue- 
Labarthe on a number of occasions. They admire the way in which 
Arendt reflects on how the destruction of public space by the Nazis in 
Germany undermined effective resistance to their murderous regime. In 
the first context, that of la politique, political institutions and inheri- 
tances, identities and party allegiances are already formed, and in play; 
in the latter, the ontology, indeed the very possibility of constituting such 
institutions, identities, and allegiances is put under interrogation. The dis- 
tinction reworks and then upsets the classical distinction between theory 
and practices, as contained within a theoretical domain, provided by the 
concept “the political.” Instead analysis is to show how that theoretical 
domain itself acquires shape and shifts as a consequence of new practices 
arriving within the supposedly subordinated domain. The discussion of 
the relation politics/the political thus provides a telling example of a con- 
ceptual deconstruction, for which a settled relation, or hierarchy, reveals 
itself to be rather the site for a contestation and instability of both mean- 
ing and understanding: indeed, of the scope of politics itself. 
 
 
It is also significant that the distinction, politics/the political bears a 
family resemblance to Heidegger’s redeployment of Husserl’s distinc- 
tion between ontic and ontological domains. The contrast is between 
ontic domains, of distinct orders of determinate entities, as delineated and 
described by Husserl, and his phenomenological descriptions, and the 
domain of ontology, re-opened, or indeed opened for the first time, by the 
gesture at the start of Heidegger’s Being and Time, announcing a retrieval 
of the question of the meaning of being, out of its Greek origins in Plato’s 
dialogue The Sophist. It can be shown that what is taken by Heidegger to 
be ontologically primary, Dasein, plays a dominant role in what can then 
be articulated and expressed in the following investigations. Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s disruption of the self-evident status, for Heidegger, of the term 
Dasein plays a major role in revealing that the subordination of the ontic 
within a prior ontological order disguises a privilege assigned to this one 
set of ontic determinations over all others. With the disruption of the 
pairing politics/the political, there is also a challenge to Heidegger’s pair- 
ing ontic/ontological, and to the consequent privilege to Dasein, as a dis- 
tinctive, unified set of capacities, the Vermögen, renamed by Heidegger 
existential potentialities, with respect to being, Seinkönnen, capacities for 
receiving and transmitting meaning, and delimiting what there is. 
The distinction between politics and the political thus carries the 
mark of Heidegger, a trace which then destines it in equal measure to 
controversy, and misunderstanding, and to an unavoidable necessity of 
considering how the  grand progress of  European culture culminated  
in twentieth century Germany in six million state-ordered murders. 
Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic and the ontological is by no 
means hard and fast, for it makes sense only with respect to the status   
as Dasein, which remains radically incomplete, in the  enquiry  broken  
off in Being and Time at the end of the second of the six proposed sec- 
tions. Heidegger construes Dasein as distinguished by its dual insertion, 
as ontically given in systems of meanings, by inheritance, but also as 
source of any possible meaning, and site for considering the nature of 
existing, while affirming its own distinctive existence (Entschlossenheit). 
Thrown into its world, Dasein projects beyond itself, and into a future, 
conceived of as radically open, thus providing both spaces and times for 
invention and  reinvention.  For  Hegel,  Dasein,  existence,  functions  as  
a third term in his dialectical logic, as a term resolving the conceptual 
antithesis between the two equivalent, but antithetical terms, being and 
nothingness. For Heidegger, by contrast and in addition, it marks a site   
of self-relating (sich zu sich verhalten), and has this dual status as both      
a specific kind of entity, with ontic determinateness, and the site of any 
meaningful discussion whatsoever, delineating what there is, and how it 
comes to be so, in an ontology. 
Long before Nancy and Derrida arrive on the scene, the meaning and 
delimitation of the scope of the term Dasein slides between a Hegelian 
 
 
determination of the concept and Heidegger’s program of exploring a  
site for self-affirmation. For Hegel, the meaning of the term results from  
a practice of resolving conflict between antithetical propositions, by mov- 
ing to a higher, more inclusive level of conceptuality in the operation 
called Aufhebung. For Heidegger, Dasein is in each case a result of a 
double gesture of repeated self-attributions (Jemeinigkeit), and of a self- 
affirmation (Bezeugung), in terms of already given collective meanings, 
inherited and transmitted. It thus acquires the status of a self-attribution 
in a context of collective inheritances and futures, and Nancy insists on 
retrieving the dimension of the Mit- of Dasein, and on a formation for 
Dasein within a pre-given context of a Mitsein, a being with, as joint 
inheritance. The key contrast here is between the operation called Auf- 
hebung, which occurs in the order of conceptually given meanings, and 
that of Bezeugung, affirmation or attestation, which functions more like   
a member of the congregation affirming the word of the preacher, by 
interleaving the exclamation “hallelujah.” 
Heidegger’s unfulfilled task then in Being and Time is  to  uncover  a 
site at which meanings for twentieth-century existing may be determined. 
Where the Greeks had temples, as analyzed by Heidegger in the 1935–36 
lectures and essay “The Origin of the Artwork,” the modern world, it 
appears, has Nuremberg rallies. Derrida opens up the possibility that 
such a meaning may arrive in the form of a misguided insistence on a 
foundational difference between human beings and other animals. This 
arrives in his papers on Geschlecht, or speciesism, and in the published 
lecture cycles, especially Of Spirit and The Animal That Therefore I Am. 
Heidegger in that essay is marking up the manner in which a combina- 
tion of architecture and religious intent in the Greek world created build- 
ings in public spaces for which he can find no obvious analogy in his own 
times. As is well enough known, in 1933, Heidegger thought that he had 
found such a source of meaning in Adolf Hitler, and his National Socialist 
Movement. 
In his noxious Rectoral Address in 1933, Heidegger urges students to 
identify with both movement and leader, invoking the three orders of 
Plato’s Republic, ruling, guarding, and developing individual skills, as  
roles to be taken up by members of the student body, thus affirming the 
Führerprinzip, the imagery of the Wacht  am  Rhein,  and  making  space 
for that specifically student duty of burning books, and destroying cul- 
ture, as memorably depicted in Elias Canetti’s social commentary Die 
Blendung, or Auto da fe, in which Canetti depicts the collapse of  Ger-  
man intellectual life. The movement with its “inner truth and greatness,”4 
the sentence inserted by Heidegger into his 1935–36 lectures: Introduc- 
tion to Metaphysics, when published after the war, may  quite  precisely 
be described as seeking to intervene in an existing system of politics, to 
reinvent it, with newly forged, and intensified practices of terror and per- 
secution, as a new ordering of institutions and meanings. Heidegger’s 
 
 
commitment was such that in extant letters he adduces failure to support 
the Nazi program as reasons for refusing to support appointments and 
promotions of academics. All this is well known, and was already suf- 
ficiently well known in France in the 1980s. 
Heidegger’s analyses of history in Being and Time reveal a further gap, 
which opens up between his understanding of meaning in history, as 
negotiable and malleable, dependent for its determinacy on an upsurge 
of human self-affirmations, the Bezeugung of Division Two, and that of 
Hegel, for whom a logic of development takes place at a level above and 
beyond the will and agency of human individuals. History for Hegel is 
construed as a progress of a consciousness of freedom, in which first  
one, then the few, and finally the many may meaningfully make a claim 
on freedom. This process may be thought of as the move from a self- 
reflection on the meaning of freedom, as first a self-affirmation, and then 
a recognition that such individual claims on freedom require that others 
concur and enable, and, finally, that all shall arrive  in  the  domain  of 
such claims. It may also be mapped on to a rough and ready account       
of human history, in which from a relation of free master and enslaved 
subordinates, a process may be discerned in which gradually systems of 
subordination and enslavement are abolished, either in line with some 
abstract claim about human rights, or because of a logic of economic 
development, in which self-exploiting workers turn out to be less of a 
responsibility than enslaved peoples, or some combination of the two. 
These alternate accounts of history can be deployed in another domain, 
in which a distinction between politics and the political may also be put 
to work, in assessing differences between Leninist or Bolshevik Marx- 
ism, which puts an emphasis on party mobilization, to seize power, as 
opposed to gradualist, Menshevik, and social democratic Marxist anal- 
yses, which proceed by building  alliances, and  supposing  the  collapse 
of capital to be an inevitable consequence of the play of contradictions 
within, and between forces and relations of production. For the latter, 
there is an extension of a logic of contradiction, and of some necessary 
process resolving antitheses between social and economic forces, thus 
extending a logic of contradiction in to the domain of actual historical 
relations. A structure of inevitability, internal to production processes, is 
expected to reveal itself as historical process, with a teleology, in which 
historical forces necessarily work through to a completion in the course 
of time. Notions drawn from an Aristotelian teleology thus combine in 
Marxist thinking with modern conceptions of economic production. 
These grounding concepts of completions, and necessary outcomes are 
disrupted and challenged through the development of the various notions 
of destinerrance, differance, and deconstruction by Derrida, thus making 
him an unorthodox kind of Marxist, if he is Marxist at all. They are also 
disrupted by the notions of unworking (désœuvrement), and a negation 
without function (négation sans emploi), from the writings of Maurice 
 
 
Blanchot and Georges Bataille, which are drawn out from their readings 
of Marx and of Hegel. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s emphasis on a logic of eco- 
technics, there is a follow through on a different kind of logical necessity, 
one of disaggregation and a distribution of forces, rather than on a logic 
of a unifying drive, forming a single historical destiny. 
 
3. Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political 
Following the conference on Derrida’s writings held at the University of 
Strasbourg in 1980, under the doubly inflected title The Ends of Man, 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe set up towards the end    
of that year a Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political. Simon 
Sparks in his introduction to Retreating the Political, provides a citation 
from their description of the initial colloquium: 
 
The colloquium The Ends of Man cannot be described as simply 
“philosophical.” It should be devoted to the possibility  of  travers- 
ing and displacing, in every sense, the philosophical, literary, critical, 
poetic, signifying, symbolic etc. regimes; and consequently, of tra- 
versing and displacing the “political” and “meaning” as well. The 
stake of the colloquium would be, in every respect, to breach the 
inscription of a wholly other politics.5 
 
It is worth noting that the phrase “tout autrement,” wholly otherwise, 
was given as the title of Emmanuel Levinas’s appreciative remarks about 
Jacques Derrida’s writing, in a contribution to the volume of French 
periodical, L’Arc, dedicated to Derrida in 1973. The notion of a retreat    
or withdrawal repeats the movement of a phenomenological reduction, 
away from the level of proliferating of appearances, to that of the essences, 
providing underlying unities of meaning, underpinning the orderliness of 
those appearances. It also cites Derrida’s notion, in the title of the essay, 
“Le retrait de la métaphore,” in which he rehearses his appreciation of 
Heidegger’s claim about the affinity between the supposedly literal mean- 
ing of metaphysical concepts, for example Dasein and  Aufhebung,  and 
the supposedly metaphorical use of terms in a secondary sense. Instead 
of affirming the classical notion of a reduction, this withdrawal rather 
reveals the radically contingent, and indeed unstable nature of symbolic 
orders and systems of signification in which the meanings in question are 
enmeshed. 
When announcing the termination of the Centre, in 1982, the follow- 
ing elaboration was given: 
 
Taken as a philosophical question, and from the point of view  of 
what we have for the time being called the essence of the political, 
the question of the political evokes the necessity of dwelling on what 
 
 
makes the social relation possible as such, and that is also to say on 
what does not constitute a simple relation (which is never given) but 
which implies a “disconnection,” or a “dissociation” at the origin of 
the political event itself.6 
 
In this closing address, two features emerge for attention: as remarked, 
there is a privilege assigned to a reading of  Hannah Arendt’s  analyses 
of time and totalitarianism, and, even more startling, and remaining to be 
taken up, “the question of the mother,” about which Nancy and Lacoue- 
Labarthe write, as a fourth issue which remains to be addressed, along 
with those of grounds, finitude, relatedness. These four components are 
to be put in focus in any further attempt to delimit the specificity of a 
domain to be called the political: 
 
4: The question of the mother It is a question which comes to us 
from Freud and we treat it in practically his own terms. It is the ques- 
tion of identification, what one can and must refer to as a general 
problematic of mimesis: how and according to what relation does 
the identification which, according to Freud, is “the earliest Stellung- 
nahme toward the Other,” take place?7 
 
Reference is made to Freud: Group Psychology and  the Analysis  of  the 
Ego. These questions of mimesis, of acquiring identity by acting out and 
performing, and of setting up a relation of differentiation, by imitating, 
functions in both individual processes of maturation and collective levels, 
forming political allegiances and identities, in ways which cry out for fur- 
ther analysis and research. 
The space thus configured sets up a relation between politics and the 
political, and an inheritance of Marxist theory and practice. It reveals the 
dimensions of a dispute between Hegel and Heidegger, on the meaning of 
Dasein, and on the scope and nature of history. In this space, there arrives 
both a series of disagreements, and a certain alliance between Derrida 
and Nancy, with a number of others, to situate an inquiry into a discon- 
nection between orders of logical and of political necessities. What is to 
be explored now is how Nancy and Derrida, in their responses to a split- 
ting between a notion of politics as usual, and a politics as insurrection, 
and, indeed, to the devastating example of Heidegger’s commitments and 
affirmations, return to and retrieve components from a reading of Hegel. 
This gesture of retrieval destabilizes Heidegger’s notion of repeating, his 
proposed Wiederholung, of an opening up in Greece to a specifically phil- 
osophical mode of meditation. My discussion thus focuses on the distinct 
moves for a retrieval or repetition, for a resolution or a suspension of a 
certain conceptuality, and on construals of a relation to history, with a 
dispute concerning the status of the term, or concept Dasein. 
 
 
Derrida’s readings of Hegel, and those of Nancy have distinct registers, 
both contributing to a joint program of work, and setting up differences 
between them. Their joint but distinct responses to Heidegger, and to 
Nietzsche and to Hegel also demonstrate differences in their philosophi- 
cal interventions, and itineraries, and play a role in the emergence of the 
differences which arrive in their estimations of, for example, the status of 
a concept of fraternity, for political thinking, and of the status of Nancy’s 
notion of a deconstruction of Christianity. For both, any formulation in 
terms of an essence of the political threatens to install a privilege to a 
Husserlian movement of reduction, and to Hegel’s logic of being, essence, 
and the concept, repressing the disruptive moment of Nietzsche’s affir- 
mation of differences between languages, and the irreducible markings 
of stylistic specificity. It suppresses Heidegger’s doubt about whether the 
withdrawal of being from the order of appearances can be thought to 
leave intact an orderly series of appearances, or whether rather in the 
modern epoch this withdrawal reveals a fragmentation and dissolution 
of unities and meaning. The question of method arrives, in the startling 
form of a challenge to the focus on posing and answering questions as 
best procedure for philosophical inquiry. 
Derrida already in 1967 had put a focus on the violence at work in the 
formation of a community through the posing of a question, and Jean- 
Luc Nancy, in posing the question: “Who comes after the subject?” as a 
topic for collective discussion, puts pressure on the structure and function 
of the question/response format which reinstalls what it seeks to ques- 
tion: the status of an individual speaking subject. These developments 
are to be expounded in the next sections, in which I shall examine first 
how Derrida’s encounter with Hegel and with the question of the ques- 
tion arrives in the early essay on Levinas, and then evolves in his reading 
of Hegel in Glas; I shall then look at the reading of Hegel proffered by 
Nancy in his early monograph, The Speculative Remark, in a context 
provided by his reflections on Nietzsche’s aphorisms, and on a relation 
between system and fragment, as set out by Bataille and Blanchot, in their 
responses to German Romanticism. 
 
4. Fraternal Relations: Derrida Reading Hegel With 
Levinas and Jean Genet 
Derrida is on record, marveling that Nancy can write a text using two 
terms which carry with them such a weight of philosophical history, 
“sense” and “world,” in his, in fact, aptly titled study The Sense of the 
World. My remarks now will rotate around two poles: this disagreement 
between them on the pertinence of this term “deconstruction of Christian- 
ity,” and a reflection on the notion of a community of the question, opened 
up, in Derrida’s early essay on Emmanuel Levinas, to which Nancy returns 
 
 
in his preface to the collection published with a long interview with Der- 
rida, “‘Eating well’ or the calculation of the subject,” under the overarch- 
ing title: Who Comes After the Subject? In the preface, Nancy disarmingly 
remarks: 
 
The role of editor I must admit has made me forget that I could and 
probably should, having asked the question, have written a response 
myself. It’s too late now and perhaps this is no bad thing. In the inter- 
view with Derrida I made some observations that will perhaps serve 
to clarify my position. But I will add a few words here to indicate the 
precise direction my answer might have taken.8 
 
Nancy then specifies that he is inclined to accept Hegel’s definition of 
“that which is capable of maintaining within itself its own contradiction”: 
 
The dominant definition of the philosophical (or “metaphysical”) 
subject is to my way of thinking the one proposed by Hegel: “that 
which is capable of maintaining within itself its own  contradic-  
tion.” That the contradiction would be its own (one recognizes here 
the dialectical law) that the alienation or extraneousness would be 
ownmost, and that subjectivity (following Heidegger here, and dis- 
tinguishing the subject-structure from anthropological subjectivity) 
consists in reappropriating this proper being-outside-itself: this is 
what the definition would mean. 
 
And he adds an important rider, concerning the function here of the verb 
“to be”: 
 
“To  be” thus has the function here of an operator of appropriation:  
in fact, it means “to have” or “produce” or “understand” or “sup- 
port” etc. In a rather hasty manner, I could endeavor to say it is the 
technological interpretation of Being.9 
 
This notion of a “technological interpretation of Being” indicates the 
manner in which Nancy will both affirm and transform Heidegger’s 
insistence, in The Question About Technology, that Being, what there is, 
arrives in the modern world in the mode of a technicity, whose essence is 
precisely not technological. 
Nancy’s analyses of a notion of eco-technics puts an emphasis on a 
current conjuncture between Marxist theories of the economy, as politi- 
cal economy, and an inheritance of classical philosophical distinctions 
between subject and object, product and producer, skills and systems of 
production, in which, as Heidegger notes, discrete skills  and  practices  
of self-forming (techne) are transposed into global systems  of  forma- 
tion and communication. The basic status of a concept of self-forming 
 
 
processes of artifice and techne, and naturally given structures and con- 
straints on growth, given as phusis, is shown to have been eroded. Hei- 
degger’s account of an intensification of nihilism, with a deepening state 
of abandonment is thus displaced, and instead, an abandonment by and 
from Being permits a proliferation of meanings, in place of single uni- 
fied structure and hierarchy, installing a space of free play, released from 
the constraints imposed by now outdated, no longer operative concepts. 
Nancy concludes his preface with the following remark: 
 
This community without the essence of a community, without a com- 
mon being, is the ontological condition of existence as presence-to. 
The plural coming is a singular coming—and this is not a prediction. 
But how could one say what it “is”? One (Who?) might try by saying: 
the plural liberates (or shares) the singular, the singular liberates (or 
shares) the plural, in a community without a subject. That is what we 
have to think about. Who thinks, if not the community?10 
 
These notions of  a  being  in  common,  without  common  being,  and  of 
a singular plurality and of plural singularity take up and develop the 
notions of partage (distribution and sharing) and comparution (joint 
appearing and collective meaning formation) already underway in his 
other writings. 
It will help to cite at some length from Derrida’s essay, “Violence and 
Metaphysics,” in order to develop how, for both Nancy and  Derrida,  
there is no longer any obvious identity to the practice, and profession of 
philosophy, and philosophizing. I shall cite Derrida with ellipses: 
 
That philosophy died yesterday, since Hegel or Marx, Nietzsche  
or Heidegger . . .; that philosophy died one day within history . . .; 
that beyond the death or dying nature of philosophy perhaps even 
because of it, thought still has a future, or even as is said today, is 
still entirely to come because of what philosophy has held in store; 
or more strangely still, that the future itself has a future—all these 
are answerable questions. By right of birth, and for one time at least, 
these are problems put to philosophy as problems philosophy cannot 
resolve.11 
 
This distinction between the form of the question and the formulation of 
a problem is to be noted, as is that between a philosophy, hypothesized 
as timeless, and philosophizing, or thinking which takes place in time, 
subject to temporal constraints and shaping, and thus with a relation     
to futurity. The juxtaposition of the classical practice of philosophy to a 
newly forged notion of thinking is of course a gesture affirming aspects  
of Heidegger’s account of some kind of turning away from the universal- 
izing mode of philosophy, constructing concepts for all eternity, to a more 
 
 
restricted and determinate meditation on and within the passage of time, 
in given languages and contexts. Derrida continues: 
 
It may even be that these questions are not philosophical, are not phi- 
losophy’s questions. Nevertheless, these should be the only questions 
today capable of founding the community within the world, of those 
who are still called philosophers.12 
 
And he signs off: 
 
A community of the question about the possibility of the question. 
This is very little—almost nothing—but which, today is sheltered 
and encapsulated an unbreachable dignity and duty of decision. An 
unbreachable responsibility. Why unbreachable? Because the impos- 
sible has already occurred. 
 
The impossible which has already occurred, with its attendant responsi- 
bilities, is the gesture of constructing a discourse, philosophy, with univer- 
sal scope, with its claim to provide an all-inclusive, overarching address. 
The benefits are that it provides the syntax for making claims on behalf 
of all human beings; the drawback is that then there begins the malicious 
enterprise of deciding who shall and who shall not count as fully human. 
Derrida invokes a triple inheritance from Hegel, from Husserl and from 
Heidegger, on a reactivation of the ambition of philosophy, as inaugu- 
rated among the Greeks, seeking wisdom in the name of truth. The twin 
inheritors of this program are the Cartesian program of collective neutral 
scientific enquiry, and the various resulting positivisms, and Heidegger’s 
gesture of reconfiguring a notion of ontology, grounded in the finitude of 
Dasein’s historical existing. The task of thinking together these divergent 
strands is blocked when the one tradition speaks and writes for the most 
part in American English, and the other, this community of this question, 
is German speaking, masculine, and  seeking, in  different ways, to claim 
a descent from  Greek  origins, in  which  dialogue, and  an intimation of 
a being beyond entities arrive as method, and as object of enquiry. The 
name of Marx, as the fourth addition to this triad, suggests a need for 
further additions of further names, through which such a restricted com- 
munity may be exposed for what is: a closed shop, or community con- 
stituted by imposing rigorous conditions for entry, such that there will 
always be an accommodation to those who arrived and claimed it first. 
My intent here is to explore how Derrida and Nancy, with certain 
others, stage the possibility of a collective inheritance, by exploring the 
distributed nature of the inheritance, by virtue of which their encoun-   
ter may be set up. Derrida’s readings of Hegel assist him indirectly with 
developing conceptions of archive, and trace, clandestination and destin- 
errance, with which he responds to the problem of Heidegger’s version 
 
 
of the political destiny of philosophy. The two key sources are the essay 
on Emmanuel Levinas, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the 
Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” which dates from before the writing of 
Levinas, Otherwise Than Being; and the non-book, or work  of  mourn- 
ing, Glas (Death Knell): What  Remains  of  Absolute  Knowledge.  Abso-  
lute knowing, le savoir absolu, has its telling abbreviation or siglum, SA, 
encrypting both Hitler’s brown shirts, the Sturm Abteilung, or riot squad, 
which romps through Heidegger’s writings, in the 1930s, and the ça of 
Freud’s id, as translated into French. Derrida is intrigued by what hap- 
pens to German concepts, when they migrate across the Rhine, and into 
French, both actually (the German occupation 1940–44)  and  virtually. 
He also provocatively reads Heidegger’s critique of the linkages between 
metaphysics, humanism, and an uncritical anthropocentrism, as a cri- 
tique of Levinas’s conceptions of the face and of ethics. He writes: “Now, 
Levinas simultaneously proposes to us a humanism and a metaphysics.”13 
Thus he locates Levinas as a classical metaphysician, closer to Heidegger 
than Levinas might find comfortable. It is a mark of Levinas’s respect and 
capacity for generous reading that he responds with warmth and appre- 
ciation to this alarming, deliberately provocative diagnosis. 
Derrida has already, with his readings of Heidegger, Nietzsche, and 
Hegel, shown how they respond to reaching some kind of limit of meta- 
physical reinvention, with conceptions of the exhaustion of metaphysics. 
An urgent need to reinvent philosophy becomes almost a common place, 
in the twentieth century, echoed across from phenomenology to an insis- 
tence on logical form, from deconstruction to logical positivism, from 
process metaphysics to neuro-cognitivism. The death knell of absolute 
knowing is tied by Derrida to a death knell for classical metaphysics, and 
where, for Hegel, the concept is formed at dusk, when the thinking pro- 
cess is completed, for Nietzsche there is here a new dawn, at Daybreak, 
while for Heidegger, the thinking process starts where the inadequacy    
of the claims of metaphysics have been recognized for what they are. 
Derrida also explores how Marx and Engels, in their Communist Mani- 
festo, had sounded the death knell of capitalism, and considers the death 
knell of philosophy, from a site informed by the meditations on finitude 
provided by the phenomenologies, variously, of Heidegger, Husserl, and, 
indeed, Nietzsche. 
In Specters of Marx these themes arrive closely twisted together, and 
Marx’s insistence on revealing a logic of capital underlying, but obscured 
by daily working relations is conjoined by Derrida to a reflection on the 
strengths and limits of Husserl’s analyses of the logic of appearances.   
For Derrida, clearly, the question is: how to write philosophy when the 
form of writing itself already predetermines what can count as meaning, 
concept, reason. The text of Glas is carefully constructed to be unread- 
able, as it proceeds in twin columns of loosely related enquiries, one con- 
cerned with Hegel’s concepts of community, and family life, his bastard 
 
 
child and experience of melancholy; and one with Jean Genet’s depic-  
tion of the life of those imprisoned, actually and virtually, in the social 
order thus instituted. The structure of family life, delineated by Hegel in 
all seriousness, as a necessary subordination of women to men, and of 
men to the state, is parodied in Genet’s meditations on the Holy Family, 
with its absent father, and sexual abnormalities, and their reenactment, 
as mimesis, in the structures of identification, desire, and violence, as they 
are formed though the sexual relations of homosexuals incarcerated in 
cells in French prisons. There are echoes too of the use made by Marx 
and Engels of the triad of the Holy Family, with its awkward doubling: 
father, son, and holy spirit; virgin mother, holy infant, incel foster father, 
to try to make sense of a division of labor between political economists  
in the nineteenth century. 
The essay on Levinas, like Glas, is similarly, strictly speaking unreadable 
since it works as a palimpsest of its own earlier versions, as published    
in 1964, and similarly positions itself in relation to, while disrupting a 
series of founding triads in philosophical narratives: Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle; Hegel, Kierkegaard, Levinas; rationalism, empiricism, critical 
philosophy; positivism, vitalism, and the New Scientific Spirit, discussed 
by Bachelard. These two texts may be studied as performances by 
Derrida of the impossibility of the possibility of a philosophical con- 
ceptuality and community today. In relation to reading Hegel, the point 
might be put figuratively, by asking whether Jews  and  homosexuals,  
and homosexual Jews, and Jewish homosexuals can  arrive  as  such  in 
the pages, and movements of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, and the 
answer is, of course, in the negative. The hybrid texts of Derrida, and 
indeed of Adorno, of Judith Butler, and of Alexander Garcia Duttman 
might be thought of as tracing the resulting lines of tension. The title and 
highly provocative contents of that other text by Marx, On the Jewish 
Question, arrives ready formed to  disrupt  in  advance  any  community 
of the question. The form of the question distributes and differentiates, 
empowers, and disempowers, in advance, all possible positions from 
which to respond. 
 
5. Nancy Reading Hegel With Nietzsche and Heidegger 
At first sight it looks as though Nancy proceeds more directly in his 
approach to reading Hegel, and to disputing the stability of the resulting 
concepts and conceptual operations. His first solo-authored monograph 
is The Speculative Remark, where the arrival of the occasional French 
term, and the invocation of Cicero’s Witz, joke or  pun, are  brought  to 
the fore. In his thesis for the Doctorat d’état, The Experience of Freedom, 
examined by among others Jacques Derrida, Nancy exposes a displace- 
ment of Hegel’s  conception  of  ethical  community,  Sittlichkeit,  through 
a disruptive reading of Heidegger on existence, Dasein, and of writing 
 
 
(écriture), as a Schreiben, to be opposed to a phenomenological Beschreiben. 
Nancy insists on the Mitsein, being with, of Dasein, discussed by Hei- 
degger as generating the notion of a coexistence, and co-appearing (com- 
parution), prior to the notion of existence, and of appearing, taken to be 
foundational in Heidegger’s analyses. Where for Derrida  the  encoun- 
ter between Hegel and Heidegger is accompanied by the voices of Levi- 
nas and Marx, for Nancy, it  is  perhaps  more  a  reading  of Adorno  and 
of Arendt which permits him to read both, Hegel and Heidegger, while 
declaring allegiance to neither. Through appreciation of the meditations 
on evil by Adorno and Arendt, Nancy arrives at a site from which  to  
open a response to evil, and its manifestations, without falling prey to  
the ontological trap of codifying evil as some kind of necessity in the his- 
tory of the world, which is shown to stand as some kind of proxy for an 
indefensible notion of a unified history of a single unified species: human- 
ity. Nancy invents for this the word “ontodicy,” and where critiques of 
ontotheology are common enough, a full exposition in terms of a critique 
of ontodicy remains to be performed. 
Nancy proposes to rethink the space of reasoning as no longer cir- 
cumscribed by Hegel’s concept of the concept, and of dialectical and 
speculative meaning, nor yet by the horizons of phenomenology, but as 
fragmentary, and with disseminating meanings, or significance, prefer- 
ring the notion of signifiance, an open-ended proliferating of meanings,  
to that of signification, which refers meaning back to systems of signs 
and signifiers, articulated in terms of pre-given systems of meaning and 
meaning transmission. Nancy, like Derrida, encounters Hegel in a context 
informed by the arrival of Lacan’s  adaptation of Hegelian conceptual-   
ity to fit with Saussurean linguistics. Lacan welds together a Hegelian 
dialectics, Saussure’s linguistic theory, and a Freudian account of the 
family, into the Lacanian system of imaginary, symbolic and real, which 
then necessarily installs Lacan as the one true Master. This monstrous 
construct is then carefully unpicked by Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, and 
Nancy, working in some kind of unison, to the extent that Lacan refers 
dismissively, if inaccurately, to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, as  Derri- 
da’s disciples. This gesture is of course revealing since the very notion of 
pursuing philosophical, or theoretical inquiry, in a mode of cooperation, 
with genuine respect of the work of others, as opposed to the mode of 
conflict and conquest, fits ill with both Lacanian and indeed Hegelian 
procedures. This would be the mode of coexistence. 
The English translation of the German terms Aufhebung and aufheben  
is given by A.V. Miller in his version of Hegel’s Science of Logic as “subla- 
tion,”“to sublate,” thus inventing a word in English to cover an innova- 
tion in Hegel’s German. Hegel’s “Remark: The expression ‘To sublate’” 
occurs at the end of the first section of the Logic, on being, nothingness, 
and becoming, marking a transition to the concept of Dasein, determi- 
nate being. This is commented on by Nancy in his monograph, with a 
 
 
focus on the occurrence of the term Witz, translated by Miller as pun. 
“The Remark” in Miller’s translation, begins: 
 
To sublate, and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), 
constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy. It is a fun- 
damental determination (Grundbestimmung) which repeatedly occurs 
throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be 
clearly grasped and especially distinguished from nothing. What is sub- 
lated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is 
sublated on the other hand, is the result of mediation; it is a non-being 
but as a result which had its origin in a being. It still has therefore, in 
itself (an sich), the determinateness from which it originates.14 
 
The series of terms to be explored are therefore: sublation, and basic 
determination, recurrence, and nothing, immediacy, and mediation. Hegel 
continues: 
 
“To sublate” has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand 
it means to preserve, to maintain and equally it also means to cause 
to cease, to put an end to. Even “to preserve” includes a negative ele- 
ment, namely that something is removed from its immediacy and so 
from an existence (Dasein) which is open to external influences, in 
order to preserve it.15 
 
Now this twofold meaning is explored, developed and parodied by Der- 
rida in his 1968 lecture “Différance” where he explores the double mean- 
ing of the term “difference,” with an underlining of a certain duplicity in 
this, and then all other philosophic terms, as ambiguous between com- 
monsense and technical meanings, by writing it as the inaudible term, 
“differance.” The philosophical term aufheben arrives out of the two 
ordinary language meanings, as indicated by Hegel, forming a third 
highly sophisticated philosophical meaning. Thus, where Derrida marks 
up duplicity, inaudibility, and a requirement that the difference of “dif- 
ferance” be marked up in written script, Hegel has marked up a triad, 
with two everyday meanings transposed into a single complex conceptual 
structure. 
Nancy is then preoccupied with what Hegel, perhaps uncharacteristi- 
cally, says next: 
 
It is a delight (erfreulich) to speculative thought to find in the lan- 
guage words which have themselves a speculative meaning; the Ger- 
man language has a number of such. The double meaning of  the 
Latin tollere (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun: 
tollendum est Octavium) does not go so far: its affirmative determi- 
nation signifies only a lifting up. Something is sublated only in so far 
 
 
as it has entered into a unity with its opposite; in this more particu- 
lar signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a 
moment.16 
 
A radical ambiguity arrives at this point. For “tollendum est Octavium” 
might be translated as: “Octavian is to be elevated.” It might also be 
translated as “Octavian is to be removed.” Furthermore, the notion of a 
“modus tollendo tollens” invokes a procedure in a syllogistic logic, for 
which modus tollens, also modus tollendo tollens (Latin for “mode that 
denies by denying,” or denying the consequent), is a valid form of argu- 
ment and a rule of inference. It is an application of the general truth that, 
if a statement is true, then so is its contra-positive. It might take the form, 
hypothesis: if not P, then not  Q;  affirmation, not  P;  therefore, not  Q. If 
he is not alive, then he cannot be Emperor; he is not alive; therefore, he 
cannot be Emperor, which was, at the time, true of Julius Caesar, but not 
of Octavian, who was about to become Augustus Caesar. 
In this context, where Octavian’s immediate predecessor, Julius Caesar 
had been assassinated, and thus removed from life, rather than raised    
to the status of Emperor, the Ciceronian pun has rather more political 
heft than at first meets the eye. Octavian becomes in due course the first 
Roman Emperor, converting Republic to Empire, as Hegel and indeed 
Nancy are, of course, well aware. Hegel continues: 
 
We shall often have occasion to notice that the technical language of 
philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected determinations, either 
because the mother tongue has no words for them, or, if it has, as 
here, because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate, 
whereas the foreign language suggests more what is reflected.17 
 
And here in a magnificent series are to be found the differentiations 
between a technical language (eine philosophische Kunstsprache), a mother 
tongue (die Muttersprache), and a foreign  language  (die fremde Sprache). 
If a people are to learn philosophy, it must learn to speak more than one 
language, and perhaps, even more, to recognize that what constitutes a 
people is always plural, not one unique ethnicity, not one single uniform 
language, and not one exclusive, self-enclosed system of expression. 
Where, for this stage in Hegel’s argument, in the Science of Logic, it is 
Dasein in which contrary forces are to be found in some kind of unity, 
Nancy, as previously noted, follows through on how, for Hegel, an ambi- 
guity in the notion of subjectivity, as grammatical and personal, as indi- 
vidual and as in common, permits this unification to be hypothesized      
in relation to a concept of the subject. However, where, for Hegel, the 
logic of the concept secures the affirmability of such a unity, the entire 
enterprise of Nancy and Derrida, reading Heidegger and Hegel separately 
and together, can be shown to reveal the instability of that unification, 
 
 
the potentially totalitarian consequences of such an affirmation, and the 
dangers of an imposition of a unity, where there is rather divergence, irre- 
ducible plurality and open-endedness. The dangers are a limitless attribu- 
tion of meaning and authority to whatever forces capture control of state 
and then international institutions. To these consequences, there are sites 
of resistance, within a collectively inherited juxtaposition of traditions. 
These sites of resistance emerge into view in careful explorations of what 
remains of absolute knowing, and in the scarcely perceptible disruption 
of Hegelian order, in Hegel’s oblique invocation of assassination, as a 
response to arbitrary rule. 
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